Proceedings of the 1970 Stanford Workshop on Grammar and Semantics.

In this book, Julius M. Moravcsik disputes that a natural language is not and should not be represented as a formal language. The book criticizes current philosophy of language as having an altered focus without adjusting the needed conceptual tools. It develops a new theory of lexical meaning, a new conception of cognition-humans not as information processing creatures but as primarily explanation and understanding seeking creatures-with information processing as a secondary, derivative activity. In conclusion, based on the theories (...) of lexical meaning and cognition, this work sketches an argument showing that the human understanding of human understanding must always remain just partial. (shrink)

Originally published in 1990, this book centres on a certain way of surveying a variety of theories of language, and on outlining a new proposal of meaning within the framework set by the survey. One of the key features of both survey and proposal is the insistence on the need to locate theories of language within a large framework that includes questions about the nature of thought and about general ontological questions as well. The book deals in an interconnected way (...) with both very general and specific issues. At one end of this spectrum there are discussions of the contrast between realist and nominalist ontologies, while at the other are analyses of specific lexical items of English. (shrink)

Originally published in 1990, this book centres on a certain way of surveying a variety of theories of language, and on outlining a new proposal of meaning within the framework set by the survey. One of the key features of both survey and proposal is the insistence on the need to locate theories of language within a large framework that includes questions about the nature of thought and about general ontological questions as well. The book deals in an interconnected way (...) with both very general and specific issues. At one end of this spectrum there are discussions of the contrast between realist and nominalist ontologies, while at the other are analyses of specific lexical items of English. (shrink)

This book, like in classical times of Plato and Aristotle, treats individual and communal ethics as intertwined.

Aristotle and the sea battle, by G. E. M. Anscombe.--Aristotle's different possibilities, by K. J. J. Hintikka.--On Aristotle's square of opposition, by M. Thompson.--Categories in Aristotle and in Kant, by J. C. Wilson.--Aristotle's Categories, chapters I-V: translation and notes, by J. L. Ackrill.--Aristotle's theory of categories, by J. M. E. Moravcsik.--Essence and accident, by I. M. Copi.--Tithenai ta phainomena, by G. E. L. Owen.--Matter and predication in Aristotle, by J. Owens.--Problems in Metaphysics Z, chapter 13, by M. J. Woods.--The (...) meaning of agathon in the Ethics of Aristotle, by H. A. Prichard.--Agathon and eudaimonia in the Ethics of Aristotle, by J. L. Austin.--The final good in Aristotle's Ethics, by W. F. R. Hardie.--Aristotle on pleasure, by J. O. Urmson.--Bibliography (p. 335-341). (shrink)

SummaryIn this paper the apparent disagreement between Kripke and Frege on the analysis of singular terms is analyzed. It is shown that Frege's theory is basically an analysis of belief, while Kripke's theory is basically an analysis of metaphysical and causal contexts. Tentative arguments are presented for showing that these two types of contexts require different analysis, thus neither Kripke nor Frege can be said to have developed a theory handling all opaque contexts.

Language, Duty, and Value Jonathan Dancy, J. M. E. Moravcsik James Opie Urmson, Edited by Jonathan Dancy, J. M. E. Moravcsik, and C. C. W. Taylor. reasons in general. This is freedom in the sense of acting on reasons, yet not those ...

Aristotle and the sea battle, by G. E. M. Anscombe.--Aristotle's different possibilities, by K. J. J. Hintikka.--On Aristotle's square of opposition, by M. Thompson.--Categories in Aristotle and in Kant, by J. C. Wilson.--Aristotle's Categories, chapters I-V: translation and notes, by J. L. Ackrill--Aristotle's theory of categories, by J. M. E. Moravcsik.--Essence and accident, by I. M. Copi.--Tithenai ta phainomena, by G. E. L. Owen.--Matter and predication in Aristotle, by J. Owens.--Problems in Metaphysics Z, chapter 13, by M. J. Woods.--The (...) meaning of agathon in the Ethics of Aristotle, by H. A. Prichard.--Agathon and eudaimonia in the Ethics of Aristotle, by J. L. Austin.--The final good in Aristotle's Ethics, by W. F. R. Hardie.--Aristotle on pleasure, by J. O. Urmson.--Bibliography (p. 335-41). (shrink)

SummaryWe need to classify emotions as objectual and non‐objectual. Some of the objectual emotions are dependent on the characterizations of their objects. So in these cases reason guides the emotions. But there are also other cases in which the conceptual dependency goes the other way. in the case of aesthetic judgments and certain types of judgments involving purpose, or compassion, the ability to make these judgments is dependent on being in certain emotional states. Thus in some cases emotions aid and (...) supplement reason.RésuméNous devons classer les émotions comme objectuelles et non objectuelles. Quelques‐unes des émotions objectuelles sont dépendantes des caractéristiques de leurs objets. La raison guide alors les émotions. Mais il y a aussi des cas ou la dépendance conceptuelle suit ?on;autres voies. Dans le cas de jugements esthétiques et de jugements comportant des buts, ou de la compassion, la capacityé de porter ces jugements est dépendante de certains états émotionnels dans lesquels se trouve le sujet. Ainsi, dans certains cas, les émotions aident et completent la raison.ZusammenfassungWir müssen die Gefühle in objektuelle und nicht‐objektuelle einteilen. Einige der objektuellen Gefühle sind von der Charakterisierung ihrer Objekte abhängig. In diesen Fällen lenkt die Vernunft die Gefühle. Es gibt aber auch Fälle, in welchen die begriffliche Abhängigkeit umgekehrt verläuft. Im Falle von ästhetischen Urteilen und von gewissen Urteilen, die Zwecke oder Mitgefühle betreffen, hängt die Fähigkeit, solche Urteile zu fällen, davon ab, dass man sich in bestimmten Gemütszuständen befindet. So kommt es, dass in einigen Fällen Gefühle die Vernunft unterstützen und ergänzen. (shrink)

The main claim of this paper is that Plato's views on social and individual good as well as his criticism of democracy can be best understood as a conscious attempt to contrast with Periclean conceptions of freedom and democracy a new point of view. It will be argued that it is a mistake to see Plato's view as either democratic or authoritarian. An adequate understanding of Plato will focus on some difficult questions concerning the relationship between freedom and knowledge; questions (...) that are rarely if ever faced clearly today. The Platonic conception and its clash with Pericles raises also some important and still unresolved questions about human motivation. (shrink)

The main claim of this paper is that Plato's views on social and individual good as well as his criticism of democracy can be best understood as a conscious attempt to contrast with Periclean conceptions of freedom and democracy a new point of view. It will be argued that it is a mistake to see Plato's view as either democratic or authoritarian. An adequate understanding of Plato will focus on some difficult questions concerning the relationship between freedom and knowledge; questions (...) that are rarely if ever faced clearly today. The Platonic conception and its clash with Pericles raises also some important and still unresolved questions about human motivation. (shrink)